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MARX, CRITICAL THEORY, AND
THE TREADMILL OF PRODUCTION
OF VALUE: WHY ENVIRONMENTAL
SOCIOLOGY NEEDS A CRITIQUE OF
CAPITAL
Alexander M. Stoner

ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the domestication of Marx’s critique of political economy within Marxist-oriented environmental sociology, and treadmill of production (ToP) theory, in particular. The aim is to explicate the theoretical
resources for a rigorous critique of capital-induced planetary degradation.
Shortcomings of ToP theory pertaining to the conceptualization of capital and
value are identiﬁed. The reasons for these shortcomings, including how they
might be addressed, are elaborated by reconsidering key aspects of Marx’s
critical theory of modern capitalist society. The chapter contributes to current
discussions in both critical theory and environmental sociology by demonstrating the continued relevance of Marx’s critical theory for understanding
the political-economic, social, and ideational dimensions of planetary degradation. In contrast to ToP theory, which critically examines the production of
wealth by counterposing ﬁnitude and limits against the expansionary tendencies of economic growth, the critical theory approach advanced in this
chapter conceptualizes the acceleration of environmental degradation
following World War II in terms of a ToP of value, whereby the necessity of
the value form is continuously established in the present. The chapter discusses
how Marxian critical theory facilitates a critical examination of the widespread growth of environmentalism as concomitant with the spread of
neoliberal capitalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Marxist-oriented environmental sociology has developed as a contemporary
movement since the late 1970s. This movement has gathered together a variety
of perspectives and interests concerned to address the contemporary ecological
crisis. A crisis because, although severe and in need of amelioration, capitalinduced planetary degradation (e.g., global warming, land degradation, water
pollution, biodiversity loss, natural resource depletion, and species extinction)
has only increased (and even accelerated) throughout the past few decades. In
contrast to afﬁrmative approaches (e.g., ecological modernization theory),
which assume that the possibility of nature–society reconciliation can be actualized through existing patterns of social change, Marxist-oriented environmental sociology assumes that existing social conditions prevent (i.e., are
antithetical to) actualizing the possibility of nature–society reconciliation. This
insight is implicitly rooted in Marx’s critical theory of modern capitalist society,
which posits a free and rational form of social organization as a possibility that
emerges within, yet remains constrained by, the capitalist mode of production
(Postone, 1993).
At the same time, there remains a gap between Marx’s original critical theory
and the 1960s New Left resuscitation of Marx’s work, which Marxist-oriented
environmental sociologists combined with an environmentalist critique of
afﬂuence and growth. By accepting the New Left appropriation of Marx,
environmental sociologists tend to either ignore or downplay the signiﬁcance of
the tradition of critical theory from the 1920s to 1960 (see, e.g., Foster & Clark,
2016) – as represented in the works of Georg Lukács (1923/1971), and the early
Frankfurt School critical theorists, in particular – which sought to advance
Marx’s project of critique and transformation during a later stage of the development of capitalist society. While these critical theorists were able to take
Marx’s critique of political economy for granted, this insight was lost in the New
Left appropriation of Marx, especially as the latter was codiﬁed through a red/
green synthesis in the 1970s. While Marxist-oriented environmental sociologists
were able to glean new ecological insights from Marx’s work, the Marx that has
emerged in their hands is a domesticated political economist, not a critical
theorist.
The central contention of this chapter is that understanding our current
ecological predicament requires a rigorous critique of capital. My overarching
objective is to explicate the theoretical resources for such a critique by reconsidering key aspects of Marx’s critical theory of modern capitalist society.1 As such,
the current chapter is part of a larger effort to bring critical theory into environmental sociology (see e.g., Cassegård, 2021; Gunderson, 2015, 2016, 2021;
Leebrick, 2015; Stoner, 2014, 2020, 2021; Stuart, Gunderson, & Petersen, 2020;
Stoner & Melathopoulos, 2015; Wehling, 2002).
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In what follows, I explore the domestication of Marx’s critical theory and
some of the resulting confusion it has created for Marxist-oriented environmental
sociology. Speciﬁcally, I focus on treadmill of production (ToP) theory, which
represents one of the ﬁrst systematic attempts to capture the nature and character
of contemporary environment–society relations from a Marxist theoretical
perspective. I will ﬁrst provide a brief overview of ToP theory before directing
focus on shortcomings of this approach pertaining to the conceptualization of
capital and value. I will then elaborate the reasons for these shortcomings and
how they might be addressed by reconsidering aspects of Marx’s critical theory of
modern capitalist society. Whereas ToP theory critically examines a ToP of
wealth (i.e. increasing use-value output) by counterposing ﬁnitude and limits
against the expansionary tendencies of economic growth, the critical theory
approach advanced in this chapter conceptualizes accelerating environmental
degradation following World War II (WWII) in terms of a ToP of value, whereby
the necessity of the value form is continuously established in the present, giving
rise to a fundamental tension between “capital time” and “ecological time.”

TREADMILL OF PRODUCTION
Although ToP theory is based on propositions advanced over four decades ago,
which have since been tested in numerous empirical studies (see, e.g., Cardenas,
2021; Carrillo & Pellow, 2021; Curran, 2017; Fu, 2015; Hayden, 2015; Houser &
Stuart, 2019; Jorgenson & Clark, 2012; Shriver, Longo, & Adams, 2020), the
theoretical tenets discussed below have changed little and remain central to the
treadmill approach.
Within American environmental sociology, ToP theory represents one of the
ﬁrst systematic attempts to capture the nature and character of contemporary
environment–society relations from a Marxist theoretical perspective. Allan
Schnaiberg developed ToP theory to better understand the linkage between the
spike in environmental degradation and the reconﬁguration of business–labor–
government relations following WWII (Schnaiberg, 1975, 1980). Schnaiberg later
elaborated the ToP, both theoretically and empirically, in collaborative work
with David Pellow, Kenneth Gould, and Adam Weinberg (see, e.g., Gould,
Pellow, & Schnaiberg, 2004, 2008; Gould, Schnaiberg, & Weinberg, 1996). ToP
theory has since become one of the most well-known approaches within environmental sociology.
ToP theory is rooted in the Marxist tradition, although, as Buttel (2004) points
out, the treadmill approach is more aptly described as a unique variety of neoMarxism. Buttel (2004, p. 326) characterizes the neo-Marxism of the ToP as
“extra-Marxist political economy” – that is, “a style of critical or radical politicaleconomic reasoning that borrows eclectically from Marx’s concepts and insights
while eschewing other aspects of Marx’s work or those of contemporary Marxists.” For example, ToP theory eschews the traditional Marxist labor theory of
value, including the idea that the proletariat is the historical agent of progressive
change, and combines neo-Marxist research on state capitalism (O’Connor, 1973/
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2001) with the analysis of monopoly capitalism (Baran & Sweezy, 1968). Within
this framework, Schnaiberg (1980, p. 208) identiﬁes three constituencies of the
economic “growth coalition”: business, labor, and government. Although these
constituencies differ across time and place in terms of how economic surplus is
mobilized and allocated, all share “in the desire to mobilize it for production
expansion” (Schnaiberg, 1980, p. 208). Citing Sweezy and Magdoff’s work on
overproduction, Schnaiberg (1980, p. 209) contends that the contemporary
environmentalist critique of growth illustrates “the utility of the broad institutional perspective of structural analysis such as Marx’s.”
ToP theory operates with a model of environment–society interaction within
which notions of ﬁnitude, ecological limits, and ecological “overshoot” play a
central role (Schnaiberg, 1980; Schnaiberg & Gould, 2001). Within this
framework, environmental degradation of all kinds is attributed to the additions
and withdrawals of matter and energy. The “industrial logic” of advanced
capitalist societies increases damage to ecosystems because such forms of social
organization “exceed ecological limits in more pernicious ways” (Schnaiberg &
Gould, 2001, p. 25), mass producing environmental “bads” such as synthetics
and toxic chemicals and accelerating the extraction of natural resources. In
addition, production became more capital intensive after WWII, requiring more
energy and material throughputs and less labor per unit of output (Gould et al.,
2004). Because these new technologies were expensive and a form of “sunk
costs,” ﬁrms needed to increase output levels to maintain or raise proﬁt rates.
The cycle of production geared toward proﬁt accumulation reduces the need for
labor inputs, thereby weakening the position of labor, while increasing environmental degradation. The deteriorating conditions of workers resulting from
the treadmill dynamics that displace them have been translated into demands
for an acceleration of this process; economic growth is seen by many as a
solution to the conditions that economic growth itself causes. Thus, throughout
the latter half of the twentieth century, the expansion of production systems also
meant that the livelihood of wage workers was increasingly dependent on
continued economic growth, thus pitting “labor” against “environmentalists”
(Schnaiberg, 1980).
ToP theory conceptualizes the “industrial logic” of the treadmill as a reference frame that reﬂects economistic models of progress and legitimizes the
superiority of the market and associated forms of social practice. As a concept,
the ToP is built around two processes: expansion of technological capacity and
the desideratum of economic growth (Schnaiberg & Gould, 2001, p. 69).
Maximizing proﬁt is boundless, and individual ﬁrms are compelled to maximize
their proﬁts in order to compete in the market (Schnaiberg & Gould, 2001,
p. 74). Firms can either go bankrupt, have a low rate of proﬁt, or have a high
rate of proﬁt. Having a low rate of proﬁt, however, can only be temporary,
leading to either bankruptcy or higher proﬁts. Proﬁts are then reinvested in
production, generating even more production ad inﬁnitum, until the system
eventually collapses. This explanation rests upon the existence of intracountry
competition, that is, interﬁrm competition.
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The Domestication of Marx’s Critique: Capital and Value in ToP Theory
This section discusses some theoretical shortcomings pertaining to the conceptualization of capital and value within ToP theory. In the latter half of this
chapter, I shall return to elaborate these shortcomings and how they might be
addressed by reconsidering key aspects of Marx’s critical theory. It should be
emphasized that my discussion is an initial attempt to confront ToP’s extraMarxist political economy with Marx’s critical theory of modern capitalist
society and, as such, has no pretense of being an in-depth analysis of related
debates or their validity.
First, as Gunderson (2015, 2017) points out, ToP theory tends to downplay
the role of ideology, giving inadequate attention to the ideational context of
environment–society relations. Although Schnaiberg et al. discuss the cultural
dimension of the treadmill logic, ToP theory places analytic primacy on the
objective political-economic dimension of environment–society relations. The
“objectivist, materialist, realist” (Buttel, 2004, p. 327) orientation of ToP theory
is consistent with Marxist-oriented approaches to environmental sociology,
particularly in the United States, which maintain a ﬁrm commitment to realist
epistemological and ontological positions. Commitment to the realist position
was reinforced throughout the 1990s with the onset of postmodern theories,
which many Marxist-oriented environmental sociologists perceived as a subjectivist and/or idealist threat (Stoner, 2014). Yet, framing the problem as primarily
one of political economy or culture has inhibited theoretical development within
environmental sociology. Absent is a robust critical theoretical approach oriented
toward recognizing critically the dynamic interrelationship between both objective and subjective dimensions of the environment–society problematic (Ollinaho,
2016; cf.; Stoner, 2014). Marx’s theory of social practice and social mediation,
which I return to elaborate below, offers a way of moving beyond such static
conceptualizations by providing conceptual tools uniquely well-suited to grasp
the linkages between consciousness and social structure.
The difference between the Marx’s critique of political economy, as elaborated
in this chapter, and the extra-Marxist political economy of ToP theory is more
than semantical. ToP scholars adopt a categorical approach, which treats the
categories of political economy (e.g., commodity, labor, value) as essentially
“external,” market-mediated economic categories. This approach stands in
contrast to the categorial framework that informed Marx’s critical theory and his
critique political economy (Postone, 1993, pp. 17–18). Marx understood the
commodity, for example, not only in economic terms but also as a mode of
cognition speciﬁc to the historically determinate form of existence under capitalism. Indeed, the categories of Marx’s mature critique, such as commodity and
value, denote alienated modes of being comprehended by thought (Marcuse,
1941/1960, p. 25), which is why Marx was able to unfold the category of commodity to indicate a historically speciﬁc form of social life characterized by
internal contradictions, such as the opposition between abstract and concrete,
and general and particular. Such an approach explodes the constructivist/realist

94

ALEXANDER M. STONER

dichotomy, which despite numerous efforts (see, e.g., Foster & Burkett, 2016;
Malm, 2018; Moore, 2015) continues to haunt environmental sociology.
Within ToP theory, failure to adopt a categorial approach has resulted in the
inadequate conceptualization of Marx’s categories, particularly his categories of
capital and value, which remain vastly theoretically underdeveloped within
environmental sociology. Indeed, ToP theory reduces the speciﬁc logic of capital,
which fuels the expansionary dynamic of “runaway” economic growth, to the
proﬁt motive driven by vested “interests” (i.e., owners and managers of big
business). While Schnaiberg et al. are certainly correct to emphasize how elite
decision-making under capitalism tends to be channeled in ways that accelerate
the treadmill, as the basis for social action, this process is operative at the
“surface level” of capital’s forms of appearance. What is missing in such an
account is an analysis of the underlying process at work – namely, the production
of value – and the ways in which elites (among other social groups), acting on the
basis of capital’s forms of appearance (i.e., the proﬁt motive), simultaneously
disguise and reconstitute the underlying structures of capitalism (see Postone,
1993, p. 196). I shall return to elaborate this elusive dynamic below in my discussion of the dialectic of transformation and reconstitution.
While the ToP approach may account for “the value consciousness that aims
for an increase in capital, i.e., the proﬁt motive” (Uchida, 1988, pp. 92–93), this
process is not explicitly theorized as such. More important, ToP theory fails to
account for the abstract, substantive dimension of capital’s value form which
underlies production, and, therefore, is unable to adequately grasp the form
economic growth must take in fully developed capitalism. Instead, ToP theory
follows the lead of Meadows, Meadows, Randers, and Behrens (1972) by
counterposing ﬁnitude and limits against the expansionary tendencies of
economic growth. This has resulted in a one-sided afﬁrmation of the use-value
dimension of the commodity form in contradistinction to its antiecological
exchange-value dimension. ToP theory captures the content, but not the form
of the treadmill’s growth dynamic. This omission is important because, in
Marx’s analysis, form determines content (see Uchida, 1988). Whereas
Schnaiberg et al. focus solely on the ToP of wealth (speciﬁed in relation to the
environmental impact of use-value output), I contend that the temporal
dimension of this process (i.e., the tendency for productivity increases to
accelerate over time) can only be adequately grasped and rigorously theorized
as a ToP of value.

MARX’S CRITICAL THEORY RECONSIDERED
Drawing insight from the work of Moishe Postone (1993), this section reconsiders
key aspects of Marx’s critical theory of modern capitalist society. I begin by
discussing Marx’s theory of social practice and social mediation, which I
contextualize in relation to his early writings on alienation. I then turn to Marx’s
later work, and his Grundrisse, in particular, to explicate the double character
of commodity-determined labor. Against this background, I discuss the

Marx, Critical Theory, and the Treadmill of Production of Value

95

contradiction between wealth and value, which lies at the heart of capital-induced
planetary degradation.
Social Practice and Social Mediation: Alienation as Self-generated Domination
One of the most important insights of Marx’s critical theory is his theory of social
mediation, which is also a theory of social practice. Marx’s theory of practice
breaks with the subject–object dualism of traditional epistemology to conceptualize objectivity and subjectivity as mutually constituted through social practice
(Postone, 1993, pp. 218–219). Marx’s critical theory aims to specify exactly how,
through productive activity, or “labor” [Arbeit], both subject and object are
produced. Praxis, as such, can then be analyzed and understood in terms of
structures of social mediation (Postone, 1993, pp. 218–220). Marx’s mature
theory is rooted in a critique of the mediating function of labor, which in capitalism structures a historically speciﬁc form of abstract socioecological
domination.
The methodological function of mediation in Marx’s mature critical theory
must be contextualized in relation to his category of alienation. Alienation,
according to Marx, is the foundation of the entire complex of social relations
under capitalism, and as such it comprises a set of mediating processes between
subject (human[s]) and object (nature).
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx considers labor in
the general sense as well as its particular form in modern capitalist society. When
Marx discusses labor in the general sense, he is referring to the mediation between
humans and the natural environment, and the ways in which, through such
laboring activity, both humans and environment are transformed in meeting a
given end (Stoner & Melathopoulos, 2015, p. 22). Labor, in general, as productive activity (which is always social), is “the fundamental ontological determination of ‘humanness’ (‘menschliches Dasein,’ i.e. really human mode of
existence)” (Mészáros, 1970/2005, p. 78), that is, the universal mediation between
subject and object (human[s] and nature). Through productive activity, both
subject and object are transformed simultaneously as labor is realized in its
objectiﬁcation (Versachlichung) (Marx, 1844/1988, p. 71). In the process, humans
produce nature and themselves, and they thereby becomes conscious as a species
being.
However, in capitalism, labor takes a particular form, which Marx calls
alienation: “In the conditions dealt with by political economy the realization of
labor appears as loss of reality for the workers; objectiﬁcation as loss of the object
[Entleerung]; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation [Entfremdung] (Marx,
1844/1988, p. 71 [translation amended]). The opposition between objectiﬁcation
and alienation, indicated by Marx’s statement quoted above, implies that in
capitalist production, instead of creating mastery through laboring activity
(objectiﬁcation), humans create structures that in turn dominate them. Marx
(1844/1988, p. 87) indicates that such structures (of self-generated domination)
refer speciﬁcally to “the production of the object of human activity as capital.”
Although the category of capital remains theoretically underdeveloped in the
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1844 Manuscripts, it is clear that Marx’s critique of alienation is directed toward
an emergent form of sociality based on exchange, where individuals do not
consume what they produce but instead must use their labor to receive a wage in
order to buy objects to consume.2
For Marx (1844/1988, p. 75–79), alienation is a process of mediation constituted by the capitalist mode of production, which, in addition to estranging
humans from self, nature, others, and consciousness, simultaneously rewrites
reality to inhibit these very same humans from consciously recognizing that this is
indeed the case (Stoner, 2014, p. 632). Within this framework, social relations, as
well as environment–society relations, are socially constituted in alienated form.
To reiterate, the mediating function of alienation (understood as a dynamic form
of social practice) is at once both objective and subjective. In capitalism, both the
subjective dimension (i.e., the social conception and understanding of the natural
environment) and the objective dimension (i.e., human–ecological transformation
via labor) of the environment–society problematic are continually constituted in
alienated form (Stoner, 2014). However, following Marx, we must recognize
critically the nonidentity of these subjective–objective moments because,
although contradictory and even opposed to one another, the subject and the
object of labor appear uniﬁed in social practice (cf. Stoner, 2014, p. 633).3
Moreover, in capitalism, cause and effect (of alienation) are inverted. Although
capital appears to be the result of alienated labor, Marx (1844/1988, p. 81)
contends that alienated labor is the real cause of capital and private property.
Hence, in his polemic against Proudhon, Marx (1844/1988, pp. 81–82) argues, “A
forcing-up of wages (…) would therefore be nothing but better payment for the
slave.” If, logically speaking, alienation is more fundamental than private
property, then it is conceivably possible to abolish private property but not
alienation, so that society, therefore, becomes “an abstract capitalist” (Marx,
1844/1988, p. 82).
Similarly, Marx does not root his critique of alienation in the opposition
between “ﬁrst nature” (i.e. the original identity of humanity and nature) and
“second nature” (the social metabolic order of capital).4 Although the conceptualization of an original identity of humanity and nature only applies to prebourgeois forms, such conceptualization only emerges under bourgeois relations
of production, where the original identity of humanity and nature turns into its
equally abstract opposite: “the radical divorce of labor from its objective natural
conditions” (Schmidt, 1962/2014, p. 82). Contra Foster (2001), Marx’s position
neither conﬁrms the social metabolic order of capital as transhistorical nor denies
the existence of a material substratum independent of labor. Rather, Marx treats
both conceptualizations of nature as the expression of alienated social relations,
which is why the opposition of “ﬁrst nature” and “second nature” is not an
opposition of noncapitalist and capitalist moments (see also Cassegård, 2021;
Cook, 2011). The fact that the original identity of humanity and nature can be
and has been projected backward onto all of human history is itself reﬂective
capital’s speciﬁc historical logic – namely, its abstract generality (Postone, 1993,
pp. 17–18).
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The Double Character of Commodity-determined Labor
Although Marx abandons the term “alienation,” his mature theory of capital is
rooted in a critique of the mediating function of commodity-determined
(i.e., alienated) labor. The mediating function of commodity-determined labor,
as I elaborate below, structures a form of abstract socioecological domination
which ﬁrst appears historically in the opposition of wage labor and capital.
Marx’s Grundrisse provides a relatively succinct account of the historical
speciﬁcity and unique socially mediating function of alienated labor in capitalism.
Labor under capitalism is no longer directly social but rather abstract and universal (Marx, 1857/1858/1973, pp. 158–164). In precapitalist social formations,
labor is directly social insofar as “various labors are imbued with meaning by the
social relations that are their context” – that is, laboring activities are “determined as overtly social and qualitatively particular” (Postone, 1993, p. 151).
However, in the capitalist social formation, where the commodity is the dominant
form, labor itself constitutes a social mediation. To say that in capitalism labor
itself constitutes a social mediation means that in capitalism one’s labor has a
dual function: “On the one hand, it is a speciﬁc sort of labor that produces
particular goods for others, yet, on the other hand, labor, independent of its
speciﬁc context, serves the producer as the means by which the products of others
are acquired” (Postone, 1993, p. 149).
What distinguishes capital in history – as something new – is a form of
abstract, impersonal social domination: “Personal independence in the framework
of a systematic objective [sachlicher] dependence” (Marx, quoted in Postone,
1993, p. 125). Citing Marx’s Grundrisse (see Marx, 1857/1858/1973, p. 164),
Postone (1993, p. 125) stresses that the “‘objective’ dependence is social; it is
‘nothing more than social relations which have become independent and now
enter into opposition to the seemingly independent individuals; i.e., the reciprocal
relations of production separated from and autonomous of individuals.’”5 As
Postone (1993, pp. 125–126) explains: “The nonpersonal, abstract ‘objective’
form of domination characteristic of capitalism (…) refers to the domination of
people by abstract, quasi-independent structures of social relations, mediated by
commodity-determined labor.” If labor is bonded in traditional society and then
becomes a social bond in bourgeois society, it becomes the form of social
domination with the advance of capitalism (Stoetzler, 2004, p. 263).
The historical speciﬁcity of such labor, as reﬂected in the commodity form, is
characterized by a peculiar double character as abstract value-creating labor and
concrete useful labor (Marx, 1867/1976, pp. 131–137). Commodity-producing
labor is both particular (as concrete labor, a determinate activity that creates
speciﬁc use-values) and socially general (as abstract labor, a means of acquiring
the goods of others). As a particular use-value, the commodity is the product of a
particular concrete labor; as a value it is the objectiﬁcation of abstract human
labor (cf. Marx, 1867/1976, pp. 125–131; Postone, 1993, p. 154). The emergence
of abstract labor, as a dominant form of social mediation, is a historically speciﬁc
process in which the labor of modern proletarians is disciplined and synchronized
through the power of the state (Thompson, 1967; Tomba, 2013). The double
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character of commodity-determined labor mediates a unique form of sociality,
which structures the form of abstract socioecological domination speciﬁc to
capital. The index of such domination is value.
Nature of the Contradiction: Wealth versus Value
The category of “value” is a historically speciﬁc form of wealth distinct from and
opposed to that of “material wealth” (Marx, 1867/1976, p. 137). These two forms
of wealth correspond to the dual character of the commodity (value and usevalue) and the two forms of labor (abstract and concrete) it embodies (Postone,
1993, p. 154). “Material wealth” corresponds to the use-value dimension of the
commodity. Wealth, as such, “expresses the objectiﬁcation of various sorts of
labor, the active relation of humanity with nature” (Postone, 1993, p. 154), and is
measured in terms of the quantity and quality of products produced. Material
wealth, as the dominant measure of wealth in prebourgeois forms of social
organization, requires a social mode of mediation that is overtly social, meaning
“it is ‘evaluated’ and distributed by overt social relations – traditional social ties,
relations of power, conscious decisions, considerations of needs, and so forth”
(Postone, 1993, p. 188). In capitalism, where value is the dominant form of
wealth, the measure of value is not overtly social; rather, value is itself a mediation (Postone, 1993, p. 188). As such, value acts as “the self-mediating dimension of commodities”; its measure “is not a direct function of the amount of goods
produced” (Postone, 1993, p. 188). Departing from the traditional Marxist
interpretation of the labor theory of value, Postone (1993, pp. 188–189) indicates
that abstract labor “constitutes a general, ‘objective’ social mediation” that is
“neither expressed in terms of the objectiﬁcations of particular concrete labors
nor measured by their quantity. Its objectiﬁcation is value – a form separable
[emphases added] from that of objectiﬁed concrete labor, that is, particular
products.”
In pinpointing value as the social mediation in capitalism, Marx was quick to
recognize the so-called “double character” of commodity-determined labor as
that which structures a new form of social domination in capital.6 In doing so,
Marx also speciﬁed the form of wealth – subsumed under value – such labor
produces. The historical speciﬁcity of value in capitalism is its abstract generality
expressed in exchange. With use-values (concrete) labor differs qualitatively, yet
“with reference to value it counts only quantitatively” (Marx, 1867/1976), p. 136).
As the expression of value, the exchange value of a commodity “is indifferent to
its natural qualities because it is the embodiment of human labor in general
measured by the time outlaid, and all the determinations of nature are extinguished in it” (Schmidt, 1962/2014, p. 66).
The Treadmill of Production of Value
The two dimensions of the social forms in capitalism discussed above (use-value/
value, concrete labor/abstract labor, wealth/value) are related through the commodity form of labor as a function of time. The exchange value of a commodity,
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including labor, is determined by the time socially necessary for its reproduction
(Marx, 1867/1976, p. 129). The structure of modern capitalist society, according
to Marx, is determined by the drive to produce surplus value and capitalize on
labor (measured in socially necessary labor time). Hence, the constant need to
produce value above the exchange value of the labor employed (i.e., surplus
value). Following Marx (1867/1976, p. 318), it is important to bear in mind that
the reference point for socially necessary labor time, as the determination of a
commodity’s magnitude of value, is society as a whole. Hence, the contradiction
between concrete individual laboring activity and abstract value-creating labor as
reﬂected in the opposition between individual and society, where the former is
subsumed by the latter, and the contradiction between value and material wealth,
where both human and nonhuman natures emerge as dead, thing-like material
bearers of objectiﬁed time.
Fig. 1 depicts the production of relative surplus value and its expansion
required by capital. This process – initially theorized by Marx – has been elaborated most fully by Moishe Postone (1993). According to Postone, and in
contrast to ToP theory, the two dimensions of capital’s social forms do not form
a static opposition but rather a dynamic interaction. Speciﬁcally, Postone (1993,
pp. 286–306) explicates a dialectic of labor and time, whereby the social labor
hour and base level of productivity are moved forward in time, giving rise to a
particular “treadmill” dynamic – what I refer to here as the treadmill of production of value. The metaphor of the ToP of value emphasizes the temporal
dimension of Marx’s concept of capital as self-expanding value (more on this
below), which, in turn, redirects focus on the growing contradiction between
wealth (measured in terms of the quantity and quality of products produced) and
value (whose magnitude is a function of the expenditure of abstract labor time).
In fully developed capitalism, once the working day has been limited, relative
surplus value is effected by increasing productivity (so as to yield a larger output
per hour worked) (Marx, 1867/1976, p. 438). But this is only effective indirectly,
for once a given level of productivity becomes general at the level of society, this
becomes the basis against which a new socially necessary labor hour is measured.

Capital
M-C-M ………………………………………………… (self-valorizing value)

Labor process/valorization

Constant capital

Variable capital

Necessary labor time

Fig. 1.

Surplus labor time

Treadmill of Production of Value.
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Although increases in productivity turn out greater quantities of material wealth
and reduce socially necessary labor time, these developments do not change the
total value produced per abstract time unit because the “constant” time unit itself
is determined by productivity as a function of the use-value dimension of
commodity-determined labor (Postone, 1993, p. 292). In this sense, the social
labor hour, although constant, undergoes what Postone (1993, p. 292) refers to as
a “substantive redetermination” – that is to say, “with increased productivity, the
time unit becomes ‘denser’ in terms of the production of goods.” Value remains
the same but is distributed across a growing number of products, thereby proportionately decreasing the value of each.7 The production of surplus value (and
its expansion required by capital) is, therefore, marked by increasing (and even
accelerating) productivity growth, which in turn necessitates accelerating biophysical throughput.8
To reiterate, once a given level of productivity becomes general at the level of
society, this then becomes the base (or referent) against which a “new” social
labor hour is measured. This, in turn, necessitates increasing productivity further,
which, once generalized, establishes another social labor hour, which then
necessitates increasing productivity even further. The connotation of the treadmill is more accurately employed as a metaphor for the production of value (as
opposed to wealth), which under current conditions must continue ad inﬁnitum.
Each “new” hour (and, by extension each increase in productivity) produces and
is produced by our actions. Although Marx’s early critique of alienation is an
initial attempt to grasp such self-generated domination, it is only later, in Capital,
that he is able to fully ground and elaborate his category of capital as “the
accumulation of alien surplus-labor time” (Uchida, 1988, p. 98; cf.; Postone,
1993). It is in this sense that the social necessity of socially necessary labor time is
quasi-objective – work in capitalist society confronts individuals as an “external”
social necessity, which they must engage as “functioning” members of society.
Whereas Schnaiberg et al. focus solely on the ToP of wealth (speciﬁed in relation
to the environmental impact of use-value output), the metaphor of a ToP of value
emphasizes the temporal dimension of Marx’s concept of capital as selfexpanding value. Schnaiberg et al.’s understanding of the ToP is static and
one-sided. Understanding capital-induced planetary degradation in terms of the
ToP of value, by contrast, means directing critical focus on the interaction
between wealth and value.9
Capital: On the Dual Crisis of Labor and Environment
Within the framework of Marx’s critique, form and content are intrinsically
related. The commodity both has a form and is a form. The content of commodity’s value dimension is a social relation – the product (commodity) is
brought into being through objectifying activity (labor). Yet, as a social form, the
commodity has another content – namely, abstract labor – and it is this latter,
substantive dimension that underlies the formalism of the capitalist system (cf.
Sohn-Rethel, 1978). According to Postone (1993, p. 268), this abstract, formalistic dimension allows Marx to put forward his formalistic account of the logic of
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capital. Yet, M-C-M9 is not the formula for a process whereby “wealth in general
is increased”; rather, it is the formula for a process whereby “value is increased,”
which is why the difference between M and M9 – what Marx calls surplus value –
is “necessarily only quantitative” (Postone, 1993, p. 267). As Postone (1993)
elaborates:
With capital, the transformation of (the commodity) form becomes an end and (…) the
transformation of matter becomes the means to this end. Production, as a social process of
the transformation of matter which mediates humans and nature, becomes subsumed under the
social form constituted by labor’s socially mediating function in capitalism. (p. 267)

The logic of capital, according to Marx, is characterized by an endless
dynamic: capital is “self-expanding value” which “preserves itself only by
constantly multiplying itself” (Marx, 1973/1857/1858, p. 270). The ToP of value is
propelled forward by capital and as such dictates the form economic growth must
take. Hence, the form economic growth takes in capitalist society is marked not
only by increasing productivity but a tendency for the rate at which productivity
increases to accelerate. The consequences of the contradiction between wealth
and value can be observed in the growing antagonism between “ecological time”
and “capital time.” The ToP of value highlights the speciﬁc temporality and
directional dynamic of capital (i.e., the tendency of the system toward accelerating productivity growth). The temporality of capital can, in this sense, be
deﬁned as the necessity to produce as many commodities as rapidly as possible.
Such “capital time” is antithetical to “ecological time” because it necessarily
accelerates more rapidly than the Earth’s biocapacity (to reproduce resources and
to absorb our waste) (cf. Rosa & Trejo-Mathys, 2013).
The ToP of value also drives technological change, which should give pause to
the optimistic predictions of ecological modernization theory. As Tony Smith
(2010, p. 211) explains, “The technologies of production and distribution will
tend to be used in a manner that depletes resources and generates wastes at a
faster rate than ecosystems can sustain.”
The tension between capital time and ecological time became increasingly
clear throughout the latter half of the twentieth century as capital’s demand on
the biosphere accelerated, further exceeding the available biological capacity of
the planet. While Schnaiberg’s ToP (of wealth) exempliﬁes the importance of
political economy for examining the post-WWII spike in environmental degradation, our current inability to subject these threats to a conscious and free
overcoming by society must be understood in relation to the dynamics of alienation and the ToP of value, which as discussed above, remain hidden at the
“surface level” of immediate experience. When value is the dominant form of
social wealth, productivity (understood as the expression of humanity’s productive abilities) is socially constituted in alienated form (Postone, 1993, p. 195; see
also Marx, 1867/1976, p. 137). Instead of being appropriated and controlled by
people, the acquired productive abilities of humanity become attributes of capital
and, therefore, dominate and control people as an alienating force, which is why
the growing importance of science and technology in the production process do
not correspond to growing amounts of value per unit time. Rather, in capitalism,
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products function simply as material bearers of objectiﬁed time (Postone, 1993).
Such heteronomy is endemic to capitalist production, and as such, cannot be
explained in distributional terms but only in terms of the form of wealth
(i.e., value) itself.
Contrary to Schnaiberg et al., the logic of capital cannot be reduced to the
“interests” of those at the top of the social pyramid who stand to beneﬁt from its
operations, though this is not to deny that certain individuals do, in fact, beneﬁt
in extreme disproportion to the vast majority. The contradiction between the
accumulated historical potential of humanity (“dead labor”) and the capitalist
production of value structured by alienation is at the heart of the Marx’s critique
of capital. The nature of this contradiction is between a world where people are
controlled by production (i.e., the historical necessity of capital) and the possibility of a world in which people consciously determine and, therefore, control
what they produce.
Although constituted by labor, the ToP of value is a quasi-objective, heteronomous dynamic that structures social action accordingly. Hence, the domination of
human and nonhuman natures is wrapped up in an alien, runaway developmental
logic, which, despite our increasing efforts, no one controls, and to which all are
subject. While the socioecological effects of the ToP of value have become
increasingly visible, the production of value remains concealed at the level of the
immediate present, insofar as the present is determined by a dynamic and contradictory totality (i.e., capital).10 The insidiousness of the ToP of value, as I
elaborate below, emerges from the interaction between capital’s dual social forms.
Dialectic of Transformation and Reconstitution: Value as
the Continual Necessity of the Present
Following Postone, the process whereby the necessity of value is continuously
established anew involves a dialectic of transformation and reconstitution of the
two dimensions of the commodity form. I alluded to this previously when, in
discussing the ToP of value and capital time, I indicated a dialectic of labor and
time, whereby the social labor hour and base level of productivity are moved
forward in time. Postone (1993) explains that at the level of totality (i.e., capital),
Marx’s analysis of the valorization process, including what I call the ToP of
value:
…is concerned not only with the source of the surplus but also with the form of the surplus
wealth produced (…) This dynamic involves a dialectic of transformation and reconstitution
that results from the dual nature of the commodity form and from the two structural
imperatives of the value form of wealth – the drive toward increasing levels of productivity
and the necessary retention of direct human labor in production. (p. 308)

Following Postone (1993, p. 308), Fig. 2 depicts the dialectic of transformation
and reconstitution between two forms of social necessity: ongoing transformations at the surface level of immediate appearance (the concrete, material
wealth dimension) and the continual reconstitution of the underlying conditions
necessary for the production of value (the abstract, value dimension). In Fig. 2,
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Ongoing transformation of the
(Surface level) of immediate appearance
ToP of wealth: Drive toward increasing levels of productivity

Twofold character of labor

Continual reconstitution of the
(Underlying) conditions necessary for the
ToP of value: Retention of direct human labor in production

Fig. 2.

Dialectic of Transformation and Reconstitution.

the twofold character of labor is depicted as the active mediation between the
material wealth and value dimensions, whereas the two structural imperatives of
the value form of wealth (the drive toward increasing levels of productivity, on
the one hand, and the necessary retention of direct human labor in production,
on the other) are depicted as occurring at the surface level and underlying
structure of society, respectively.
Central to the ToP of value, as indicated above, is a dialectic of labor and time
in which socially general productivity increases redeﬁne the basis against which
further increases in productivity must be effected. Because productivity is rooted
in the use-value dimension of labor, it is possible to conceive of the “forward”
movement of the abstract temporal frame of reference “as a mode of concrete
time” (Postone, 1993, p. 293). That the interaction between capital’s use-value
and value dimensions can be conceived in this way is itself indicative of capitalism. As Postone (1993, p. 293) explicates, the interplay of abstract labor and
concrete labor sheds light on the foundation of Marx’s analysis of capital,
especially the fact that a feature of capitalism is a mode of (concrete) time that
expresses the motion of (abstract) time. Historical time within capitalist society,
then, is socially constituted (via praxis) insofar as it is mediated by value.11
Yet, because the “entire abstract temporal axis, or frame of reference, is
moved with each socially general increase in productivity” (Postone, 1993, p.
293), the historical movement of the ToP of value (i.e., its parameters as dictated
by the directional dynamic of capital) cannot be adequately grasped in twodimensional (x-y axis) terms. As Postone (1993) elaborates:
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Although the measure of value is time, the totalizing mediation expressed by “socially necessary
labor time” is not a movement of time but a metamorphosis of substantial time into abstract
time in space, as it were, from the particular to the general and back. (p. 292)

According to Postone (1993), although one can measure the consequences of
the production of value within the framework of abstract Newtonian time:
…the historical developments themselves (…) cannot be quantiﬁed as dependent variables of
abstract temporality (that is, in value terms), even though the requirements of the social form of
value mold the concrete form of production in which the accumulation of knowledge,
experience, and labor is objectiﬁed. The movement of history, then, can be expressed
indirectly by time as a dependent variable; as a movement of time, though, it cannot be
grasped by static, abstract time. (p. 297)

While both abstract and historical forms of time are intrinsically related, the
abstract temporal unit is distinct in that “it does not manifest its historical
redetermination – it retains its constant form as present time” (Postone, 1993,
p. 295). Like the commodity form, the “social ‘content’ of the abstract temporal
unit remains hidden” (Postone, 1993, p. 295). Moreover, value, as an expression
of time as the present, represents an external social norm to which actors comply
(Postone, 1993, p. 295). Postone (1993) applies this insight into Marx’s example
of the power loom as follows:
The social labor hour in which the production of 20 yards of cloth yields a total value of x is the
abstract temporal equivalent of the social labor hour in which the production of 40 yards of
cloth yields a total value of x: they are equal units of abstract time and, as normative, determine
a constant magnitude of value. Assuredly, there is a concrete difference between the two, which
results from the historical development of productivity; such a historical development, however,
redetermines the criteria of what constitutes a social labor hour and is not reﬂected in the hour
itself. In this sense, then, value is an expression of time as the present. It is a measure of, and
compelling norm for, the expenditure of immediate labor time regardless of the historical level
of productivity. (p. 296)

The dynamic of capital gives rise to a growing disparity between the accumulated historical potential of humanity and the production of value. For Marx,
the retention of direct human labor in the production process, as that which
underlies the value form, becomes increasingly anachronistic in the face of the
immense wealth-producing potential of industry. As he notes, “The theft of alien
labor time, on which the present wealth is based, appears a miserable foundation
in the face of this new one, created by large-scale industry” (Marx, 1973/1857/
1858, p. 704). This growing disparity, however, does not automatically undermine the necessity of the present, represented by value, but rather changes the
“concrete presuppositions of that present, thereby constituting its necessity anew”
(Postone, 1993, p. 299). Value, as an expression of time, is what indicates the
historical movement of capital as simultaneously dynamic and static: “It entails
ever-rising levels of productivity, yet the value frame of reference is perpetually
reconstituted anew” (Postone, 1993, p. 299). As constituted by capital, historical
time is invariably naturalized “into the framework of the present, thereby reinforcing that present” (Postone, 1993, p. 300).
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The use-value and value dimensions of capital’s social forms, as discussed
above, do not simply form a static opposition. Rather, both dimensions interact
through an ongoing “process of reciprocal determination,” effecting “a directional dynamic in which (…) concrete labor and abstract labor, productivity and
the abstract temporal measure of wealth, constantly redetermine one another”
(Postone, 1993, p. 290). This “ongoing pattern of social transformation and
reconstitution,” according to Postone, is perhaps the best estimate of a so-called
Marxian “law of value.”

NEOLIBERALISM AND
CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTALISM
The Marxian critical theory framework outlined above allows one to gain a better
understanding of the widespread growth of environmentalism as concomitant
with the spread of neoliberal capitalism. The onset of neoliberalism in the 1970s
marks a transition from state-centric capitalism, in which the decline in industrial
output that plagued the 1930s was overcome through state planning and coordination of the economy. This shift resulted in tremendous advancements in
productivity and related forms of accumulated knowledge that fueled the postWWII spike in environmental degradation, which environmental critics characterize as productivism. These developments also entailed massive transformations
in social life. The technologies associated with the productivist dimensions of
state-centric capitalism, for example, allowed the mass production of commodities, which in turn allowed a decline in prices and facilitated a mass consumer
market. The discontents articulated by the environmental movement during the
late 1960s and early 1970s expressed the fact that a productivist industrial society
is not adequate to the well-being of the natural environment.
But precisely when it became possible to question the ecological impacts of the
capitalist work regime during the 1970s, the necessity of this regime reasserted
itself; as unemployment rates skyrocketed, “work” became a matter of increasing
social necessity (Postone, 1978). Although the early environmentalist criticism
was articulated at a time when the material expansion of the post-WWII regime
had developed to such an extent that it became possible to question its necessity,
the development of contemporary environmentalism did not correspond to a
related shift in how society was organized. In fact, the exact opposite happened as
the growth of environmentalism during the 1970s and 1980s was synchronous
with the expansion of neoliberal global capitalism.
The restructuring of capital in neoliberal form is an attempt to reconstitute the
underlying structural preconditions for the capitalist production of value discussed above. The crisis of state-centric capitalism during the mid-1970s incited a
sweeping restructuring of capital that continues to this day. I have already
mentioned the spike in unemployment and the resurgence of the necessity of work
that accompanied this economic downturn. Other important developments
include trends commonly associated with “neoliberal” capitalism: ﬁnancialization, the shift toward monetary, supply side economics bolstered by the nation
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state, the transformation of business and labor, and the creation of an infrastructure conducive to the formation of a global economy.
The issue of productivism and its connection to the problem of redistribution
has been a source of confusion for environmentalism since the 1960s (Stoner &
Melathopoulos, 2016). The climate justice movement, for example, foregrounds
the issue of redistribution (e.g., “carbon debt,” “ecologically unequal exchange,”
etc.) but opposes redistribution predicated on productivism. While such an
approach correctly identiﬁes the great acceleration of ecologically destructive
patterns of development that took form in the 1930s, the notion that socialism
would reconcile the capitalism-nature antithesis by decoupling productivism from
redistribution remains suspect.
Within the framework of Marx’s critical theory, overcoming capitalism
involves a transformation not merely of distribution but more fundamentally of
the mode of production itself. Overcoming capitalism would involve the transformation of capitalist social relations, and the abolition of production resting on
value measured in socially necessary labor time, in particular. Yet, insofar as the
current historical juncture is determined by the logic of capital, moments of
historical possibility are skewed at the level of the immediate present. By specifying the social mediations at work in the dialectic of transformation and
reconstitution of capital, Marx’s critical theory is uniquely suited to provide
conceptual tools capable of grasping the ways in which the horizon of possibility
looks different at the level of historical immediacy.

CONCLUSION
Although Schnaiberg et al.’s treadmill metaphor alludes to a phenomenon that is
simultaneously static and dynamic, ToP theory has been restricted to analyzing
the concrete wealth dimension, namely, the socioecological consequences of
increasing use-value output. What is missing in the traditional ToP account is
analysis and critique of the dialectic of wealth and value as driven by capital. The
possibility of such critique is rooted in the double-sided nature of capital’s social
forms, rather than between these social forms and “nature” or “labor” (understood transhistorically) (Postone, 1993). Grasping the interaction between these
two (wealth/value) dimensions is important because, insofar as substantive
changes effected by the use-value dimension remain nonmanifest within the
abstract temporal frame of value, these changes cannot be recognized critically
within the framework of the present.
The nature of the contradiction between material wealth and value directs
focus on the ways in which the socioecological tensions endemic to capitalist
society are structured by a historically speciﬁc form of human activity
(commodity-determined labor), which shapes action and consciousness, including
social conceptions and understandings of the natural environment. Although the
environmental impact of the ToP of wealth is becoming increasingly evident,
the process continues in large part because the ToP of value remains hidden at
the “surface level” of immediate appearance. Indeed, the emergence of
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“contemporary ecological subjectivity” (see Stoner & Melathopoulos, 2015,
pp. 62–65), evidenced by the globalization of environmentalism, is not separate
from, or necessarily opposed to, the domination of capital and may, in fact, serve
to obscure the underlying sociostructural dynamics at work (see Stoner &
Melathopoulos, 2015, pp. 57–62; Stoner, 2021).
Current research examining the potential of work time reduction (WTR) as a
strategy for constructive ecological practice (see, e.g., Gunderson, 2019; Hayden &
Shandra, 2009; Knight, Rosa, & Schor, 2013; Pullinger, 2014) could be conceptually enhanced by incorporating insights from the ToP of value, as discussed here.
Such an approach would allow one to scrutinize critically windows of opportunity
opened by the increasing superﬂuity labor while recognizing the ways in which
these very same structural circumstances simultaneously constrain the possibility of
qualitative social change. At the same time, understanding our current ecological
predicament in terms of compounding levels of alienation (Dahms, 2011) severely
complicates the urgent political tasks involved. For most individuals in advanced
capitalist societies, an alternative nonalienated set of socioecological mediations is
seemingly beyond imagination, as our identity, who we are and how we function is
so completely tied to the capitalist production of value (Stoner, 2020, 2021). The
challenge is that we have no reason to assume that we can contribute to altering the
destructive dynamics of capital, environment, and society if we, as individuals,
refuse to make real changes in our lives, in our standard of living, and especially in
our social relations and modes of interaction.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author thanks the editor and anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments and
suggestions.

NOTES
1. My approach is deeply indebted to the work of Moishe Postone (1993), who has
arguably provided the most sophisticated reinterpretation of Marx’s critical theory to date.
2. The category of “object,” as well as “labor” (as a general category), is historically
constituted. Both exclusively emerge in capitalism. Likewise, money, as a universal
equivalent, presupposes a “world” in which everything is up for exchange.
3. As Postone (1993, p. 222) explains, “In capitalism, both moments of people’s relation
to nature are a function of labor: the transformation of nature by concrete social labor can,
therefore, seem to condition the notions people have of reality, as though the source of
meaning is the labor-mediated interaction with nature alone. Consequently, the undifferentiated notion of ‘labor’ can be taken to be the principle of constitution, and knowledge of
natural reality can be presumed to develop as a direct function of the degree to which
humans dominate nature.”
4. Here, Marx’s insights stand in opposition to John Bellamy Foster’s (2001) well-known
theory of metabolic rift. Foster’s theory is rooted in an uncritical and ahistorical afﬁrmation of “labor” (as the universal metabolic relation between society and nature), which
then becomes disrupted in the social metabolic order of capital, giving rise to an irreparable
rift (for a critique of Foster, see Cassegård, 2021; Stoner, 2014; Stoner & Melathopoulos,
2018).

108

ALEXANDER M. STONER

5. As Marx (1973/1857/1858, p. 164) explains, “individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another.”
6. In Capital, Vol. 1, Marx (1976/1867, p. 132) indicates the signiﬁcance of the double
character of commodity-determined labor, commenting that he was “the ﬁrst to point out
and critically examine” the twofold nature of commodity-determined labor, and that an
adequate understanding political economy requires its elucidation.
7. According to Postone (2009, pp. 98–107), Marx’s falling rate of proﬁt thesis is an
attempt to capture this dynamic in a radically critical and immanent manner.
8. Although ToP scholars are correct that technological innovation is not determined by
social or environmental needs but by the need to expand and absorb proﬁt (see, e.g., York
& Julius, 2016), ToP theory has not yet recognized the ways in which efﬁciency increases
are patterned by the ToP value. Marx’s theory of value, as discussed here, is an important,
though underutilized, theoretical resource for understanding the so-called “Jevon’s
paradox,” in which the efﬁciency with which a resource is used corresponds to an
increasing rate of consumption of that resource.
9. Cassegård (2021) also examines the tendency within green critical thought to focus on
capital’s material outside, metabolism per se, and usevalue at the expense of second nature
and the valueform. The argument about the interaction of capital’s dual social forms and
the natural environment is congruent with the theoretical approach outlined in this
chapter. As Cassegård (2021, p. 98) explains: “[t]he point is not to choose between focusing
on second and ﬁrst nature or value and use-value, but having the tools needed for an
analysis that illuminates the contradictory relation between them.”
10. In this sense, Foster’s (2016) reading of the post-WWII period as an “age of
ecological enlightenment,” in which the growth of ecology and radical environmentalism
lead to a future socialist revolution, is not necessarily “wrong” but rather reﬂective of how
our theoretical understandings of history mirror the current inability to bring about
qualitative social change.
11. In contrast to the concept of “agency” in structuralism, poststructuralism, and many
of the recent developments in contemporary sociological theory, “agency” within a critical
Marxian framework is always constrained, which is to say that “structure” is not the
opposite of agency but is rather constitutive of agency.
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